As the first Departmental visitor to the reconstructed Syrian Arab Republic I was given the full treatment in Damascus. From the US point of view, the new Syrian regime, if it demonstrates staying power, represents a promising opportunity.
The Ministers call this the first liberal revolution among the Arabs. They point out rapidly that it is not reactionary, but for the first time offers Arabs an opportunity for vigorous social advance under non-totalitarian conditions. They want to relax some of his stringent measures without awakening fears among workers and farmers that gains made under Nasser will now be lost. I got no indication of current relations between the army and the civilian Cabinet. The Cabinet itself looks technically strong and politically weak.
It needs to resist efforts by land owners and businessmen to pull it far to the right. Kuzbari is aware of this and a long-range threat from the left. The Cabinet meets practically daily, from late afternoon or early evening frequently until midnight. So far it has been moving in generally sound directions. The Prime Minister told me in almost so many words that he wants Syria to be neutralβon our side. He cannot immediately strike down the major economic and military relations with Bloc countries developed during the UAR period.
He knows the Bloc is eager to maintain these relations, and that the US cannot easily replace the Bloc as a market for Syrian cotton or as a provider of military equipment. Nevertheless, Kuzbari claims to want closer political and economic relations with the US than Syria has permitted in the past. His Ministers have already asked us about an aid agreement, which of course Syria never previously was willing to negotiate.
Partly as a protection against efforts by Nasser to infiltrate and subvert his regime, Kuzbari wants good relations with his Arab neighbors. Arab nationalism must still be a strong talking point. I came away feeling that the survival and stability of the Kuzbari regime or something like it are strongly in the U. It exists and its failure will doubtless be followed by something more extreme. If it succeeds, it could provide a rallying point for liberalβas contrasted to extremeβArab politics.
